Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the United States:

Current Case Law and Issues

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I. Overview of US Sex Offender Registration

Sex offender registration and notification systems have been established within the United States in a variety of ways. There are a number of resources which are referred to, loosely, as ‘sex offender registries.’ For the purposes of clarification, we start this summary with an outline of those systems.

Registration is a Local Activity

In the United States, sex offender registration is conducted at the local level. The federal government does not have a comprehensive system for directly registering sex offenders. Generally speaking, sex offenders in the United States are required to register with law enforcement in each state, locality, territory, or tribe within which they reside, work, or attend school.

Each state has its own distinct sex offender registration and notification system. The District of Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and over 100 federally-recognized Indian Tribes have their own sex offender registration and notification systems, as well. Every one of these systems has its own nuances and distinct features. Every jurisdiction (meaning each state, territory, or tribe) makes its own determinations about who will be required to register, what information those offenders must provide, which offenders will be posted on the jurisdiction’s public registry website, and so forth.

Even though sex offender registration itself is generally not directly administered by the federal government, the federal government is involved in sex offender registration and notification in a number of meaningful ways.

Federal Minimum Standards

Over the last two decades Congress has enacted various measures setting ‘minimum standards’ for jurisdictions to implement in their sex offender registration or notification systems. The first of these was passed in 1994 and is commonly referred to as the ‘Wetterling Act.’ This Act established a set of minimum standards for registration systems for the states. Two years later, in 1996, ‘Megan’s Law’ was passed as a set of minimum standards for community notification. The most recent set of standards can be found in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which was passed in 2006. SORNA currently governs the federal minimum standards for sex offender registration and notification systems.
If a state, tribe, or territory chooses to refrain from substantially implementing SORNA’s standards, the jurisdiction risks losing 10 percent of its Edward R. Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) funds. As of September 15, 2016, 17 states, 3 territories, and over 100 federally-recognized Indian Tribes have substantially implemented SORNA. It is important to note that there are still variations in the registration and notification laws among jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA. Practitioners are advised to become familiar with the specific registration and notification systems in any and all jurisdictions within which they will be working.

National Sex Offender Public Website

The National Sex Offender Public Website (NSOPW), located at www.nsopw.gov, was created by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2005 and is administered by the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking (SMART Office). NSOPW works much like a search engine: jurisdictions that have their own public sex offender registry websites connect to NSOPW by way of a web service or automated upload to enable NSOPW to conduct queries against the jurisdictions’ websites. Only information that is publicly disclosed on a jurisdiction’s own public sex offender registry website will be displayed in NSOPW’s search results, and only the jurisdiction’s registry website page will be displayed on the results page of NSOPW. The Department of Justice does not administer any of the registration information that is searched whenever a query is made through NSOPW, and only ensures that the information that is available on jurisdictional websites can be queried through NSOPW.
Federal Law Enforcement Databases

Federal databases are utilized by law enforcement across the country to access accurate information about registered sex offenders. Registering agencies and other units of state and local law enforcement submit the information necessary to populate these databases:14

1. **NSOR:** The National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) is a law-enforcement only database that is a file of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) division. It was created in the late 1990s to store data on every registered sex offender in the United States, and to provide access to that data to law enforcement nationwide.15

2. **NGI:** The Next Generation Identification (NGI) system officially replaced the legacy fingerprint database at the FBI (IAFIS) in October of 2014.16 NGI fingerprint records are linked to the offender’s corresponding NSOR record at CJIS.

3. **NPPS:** The National Palm Print System (NPPS) is the database for palm prints housed with the FBI.

4. **CODIS:** The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) is the national DNA database administered by the FBI.

SORNA requires that jurisdictions submit registration information about their registered sex offenders to NSOR, and ensure that offenders’ fingerprints have been submitted to NGI, palm prints to NPPS, and DNA profiles to CODIS.17

Federal Corrections

Part of the federal government’s involvement with sex offenders who are required to register concerns the handling of those offenders as they are housed and subsequently discharged from federal correctional institutions. In particular, concerns have been raised about notifying local law enforcement when a sex offender is released from federal custody. Issues specific to military detention are discussed separately in the section on military registration, below.

1. **Bureau of Prisons**

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) does not register sex offenders prior to their release from incarceration, as registration is primarily a state function. However, 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c) requires that BOP or a federal probation officer provide notice to the chief law enforcement officer and registration officials of any state, tribe, or local jurisdiction whenever a federal prisoner required to register under SORNA is released from custody.18 In May of 2014, moreover, BOP issued new guidelines governing its release of sex offenders.19
2. **Bureau of Indian Affairs**

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) operates approximately 24 Detention Centers.\(^\text{20}\) However, because BIA is an agency of the Department of the Interior, it is not governed by the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c). There are no generally applicable statutory or administrative requirements for BIA-operated Detention Centers to provide notice to local law enforcement when a sex offender is released from custody. In practice, offenders in BIA facilities generally are not registered prior to their release from incarceration.

3. **Immigration and Customs Enforcement**

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) is generally responsible for detaining and deporting undocumented individuals who are present within the United States. As of September 2012, five percent of the nearly 60,000 aliens under an ‘Order of Supervision’ in the community after being released from detention and pending deportation actions had been previously convicted of a sex offense.\(^\text{21}\) ICE-ERO has previously been faulted for having no regular method of notifying local law enforcement when a sex offender, or any offender, is released from ICE-ERO custody.\(^\text{22}\) However, in 2015 DHS put forward a rule amending their Privacy Act provisions to permit the transfer of information from DHS to any sex offender registration agency about an offender who is released from DHS custody or removed from the United States.\(^\text{23}\) Like the Bureau of Prisons and BIA detention facilities, offenders are not registered prior to their release from ICE custody.

**Federal Law Enforcement and Investigations**

SORNA designated the United States Marshals Service (USMS) as the lead agency in investigations of suspected violations of the federal law regarding failure to register as a sex offender, which is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2250. In order to further their investigative capacity, the USMS established the National Sex Offender Targeting Center (NSOTC) in 2009.\(^\text{24}\)

**Military Registration**

If a person resides, works, or attends school on a military base, depending on the source and manner of obtaining the land held by the federal government on which the base is located, a state might have no jurisdiction at all over matters occurring thereon. In other words, the base may be a ‘federal enclave’ where only federal law applies.\(^\text{25}\) Because of that, in some locations there may be sex offenders present on military bases who are not required to register with the state because they live, work and attend school solely on land considered to be a federal enclave.

In 2013, Congress enacted a provision that prohibits any person convicted of a felony sex offense from enlisting or being commissioned as an officer in the Armed Forces.\(^\text{26}\) In
August 2014, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a report regarding DoD’s compliance with SORNA.\textsuperscript{27}

Prior to 2015, there had been no provision of federal law (since the passage of SORNA) which generally enabled or permitted federal authorities to register sex offenders such that the information from those registrations would be connected to any national databases. In May 2015, Congress amended SORNA to require DoD to provide information to NSOR and NSOPW on any sex offender who is adjudged by courts-martial or released from a military corrections facility.\textsuperscript{28} In November 2016, DoD issued an Instruction establishing policies for the “identification, notification, monitoring, and tracking of DoD-affiliated personnel” who are registered sex offenders.\textsuperscript{29}

Certain components of the Department of Defense have also adopted policies and procedures to independently track and monitor sex offenders who are either active duty members, civilian employees, contractors, or dependents of active duty members located on U.S. military installations at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{30} For example, the Department of the Army now requires all sex offenders who reside or are employed on an Army installation (including those outside of the continental United States) to register with the installation Provost Marshal.\textsuperscript{31}

Offenders convicted by military tribunals of registerable sex offenses are required under SORNA to register with any jurisdiction where they live, work or go to school, subject to the limitations described above.\textsuperscript{32} Through a series of statutory and administrative cross-references, SORNA requires that persons register as a sex offender whenever they have been convicted of a UCMJ offense listed in Department of Defense Instruction 1325.07, which was revised in 2013.\textsuperscript{33}

1. Publication of Sex Assault Courts-Martial Results

The U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force have all started to publicly disclose information about convictions for sex offenses, although such disclosures are not occurring on NSOPW at the present time.\textsuperscript{34} While it does not make available a universal list of sexual assault Courts-Martial, in 2013, the Army issued a directive to initiate discharge proceedings against any active duty convicted sex offender.\textsuperscript{35}

2. Unique Issues for Registration of UCMJ Convictions

Given the unique structure of the military justice system, certain issues arise that are distinct from those in civilian courts. For example, a state-level requirement to register based on a conviction of a sex offense in ‘federal court’ was held to also include a court-martial from a military court.\textsuperscript{36} In at least one state, an offender convicted under article 134 of the UCMJ for an offense relating to child pornography was required to register because the offense of conviction was determined to be a “like violation” to a state offense.\textsuperscript{37}
Summary

This hybrid framework of state, territorial, tribal, local, military, and federal laws and policies is the context in which the case law regarding sex offender registration and notification has developed. The summary which follows intentionally avoids any lengthy discussion of the legal issues and case law surrounding prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the federal failure to register statute. That topic is worthy of its own guide, and is largely beyond the intended scope of this summary.

II. Who is Required to Register?

Nearly all registration requirements in the United States are initially triggered by a conviction for a criminal offense. Most jurisdictions limit their registration and notification systems to persons convicted of sex offenses and non-parental kidnapping of a minor. Some states also include other violent or dangerous offenders in their registration and notification system.

‘Sex Offenders’

Federal courts have interpreted SORNA as directly imposing a duty on a person to attempt to register if they meet the federal definition of ‘sex offender’. SORNA’s standards call for jurisdictions to register all persons who have been convicted of a tribal, territory, military, federal, or state sex offense. In addition, certain foreign sex offense convictions will also trigger a registration requirement under SORNA. Generally speaking, however, in practice a jurisdiction will not register an offender unless that jurisdiction’s laws require that the offender be registered. However, at least one state has concluded that if a person has ever been required to register as a sex offender pursuant to federal law, that person is required to register in the state. In addition, at least one state will impose the registration requirements of the originating state, even if the new state’s requirements are less stringent.

‘Catch-All’ Provisions

When jurisdictions specifically outline the offenses that require registration, there is little question as to who is required to register. Most jurisdictions, however, also include ‘catch-all’ provisions which, in varying forms, generally require any person convicted of an offense which is ‘by its nature a sex offense’ to register as well. One court recently concluded that the state need only prove by ‘clear and convincing’ evidence that an
offender engaged in sexual contact in order to qualify under its catch-all registration provision, while another held that such proof must meet the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.

*Comparable Convictions from Other Jurisdictions*

A more difficult situation arises when a convicted sex offender moves from one jurisdiction to another, and the new jurisdiction has to make a determination as to whether the person is required to register there. When a person has an out-of-state conviction, most jurisdictions require registration for any offense which is ‘comparable,’ ‘similar,’ or ‘substantially similar’ to one or more of the receiving jurisdiction’s registerable offenses. When a state’s registration system treats persons convicted of in-state offenses differently from those convicted out-of-state, equal protection problems may arise. On occasion, offenders have had their convictions expunged, but still might face registration requirements in other states. At least one state has issued an Attorney General opinion determining that “out-of-state offenders whose convictions have been expunged must register…if they were required to register” in another jurisdiction as a sex offender.

*Elements vs. Facts*

Making the determination as to whether an offense fits under one of these ‘catch-all’ or ‘comparable’ provisions has led to a great deal of litigation. Some jurisdictions look at just the elements of the offense of conviction, while others will also look at the facts underlying the conviction. Often, courts take an expansive view of which offenses will trigger registration requirements; though sometimes, the approach can be quite narrow.

*Recidivists*

In many states, as under SORNA’s requirements, an offender who has been convicted of more than one sex offense is subject to heightened registration requirements. One court has held that the two (or more) offenses do not need to arise out of separate proceedings in order to trigger these increased requirements.

**III. Registration of Juvenile Offenders**

State juvenile justice systems within the United States have handled juvenile sex offender registration in different ways. For example, at the time of SORNA’s passage, 36 states required certain juveniles adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses to register as sex offenders, while the remainder did not require any such juveniles to register. SORNA’s minimum standards do require registration for certain juvenile offenders adjudicated delinquent of serious sex offenses. Moreover, SORNA does not require jurisdictions to disclose information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent on their public registry websites.

On August 1, 2016, the Juvenile Supplemental Guidelines were published in the Federal Register. In the event that a jurisdiction does not exactly conform with the
juvenile registration requirements under SORNA, the Juvenile Supplemental Guidelines permit the SMART Office to expand its inquiry in the process of making a determination as to whether a jurisdiction has substantially implemented SORNA’s juvenile registration provisions. Specifically, the Juvenile Supplemental Guidelines allow the SMART Office to review the following:

(i) Policies and practices to prosecute as adults juveniles who commit serious sex offenses;

(ii) Policies and practices to register juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious sex offenses; and

(iii) Other policies and practices to identify, track, monitor, or manage juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious sex offenses who are in the community and to ensure that the records of their identities and sex offenses are available as needed for public safety purposes.\(^{59}\)

**Juvenile Registration Requirements Vary Across Jurisdictions**

Despite SORNA’s requirement that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain offenses register as a sex offender, the implementation of this provision varies across jurisdictions.\(^{60}\) Some jurisdictions do not register any juveniles at all; some limit the ages of the offenders who might be registered; some limit the offenses for which they might be registered; and others limit the duration, frequency, or public availability of registration information.\(^{61}\) Some jurisdictions have mandatory registration provisions for certain juveniles, some are discretionary, and some have a hybrid approach.\(^{62}\) At least one jurisdiction required a person who committed an offense at age 12 – who would not have been required to register under SORNA had an adjudication occurred at the time of the offense – to register as an adult because the conviction for that offense did not occur until after the individual was 18 years of age.\(^{63}\)

As with adult registration requirements, registration requirements for juveniles are generally triggered by the equivalent of a conviction for a sex offense in juvenile court, which is typically referred to as an ‘adjudication of delinquency.’ Most jurisdictions mandate registration for juveniles transferred and convicted for sex offenses in adult court. In addition, one federal circuit court has held that a person previously adjudicated delinquent of a SORNA-registerable offense in state court can be ordered to register as a sex offender as a mandatory condition of probation for a subsequent, unrelated federal conviction.\(^{64}\)

Because of the varying nature of juvenile justice systems across jurisdictions, problems often arise when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent in one jurisdiction and then moves to another.\(^{65}\) Many of those issues mimic the issues discussed above regarding adult offenders.
Issues Unique to Juvenile Adjudications

There are some issues unique to juvenile court cases. When a jurisdiction requires that juveniles be subjected to registration requirements more onerous than those imposed on adults convicted of the same offense, equal protection issues exist. In two states, the automatic lifetime registration requirement as applied to adjudicated juveniles was held to unconstitutionally violate due process and, in one of those states, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. However, when a juvenile court judge refuses to order a juvenile to register, as required by statute, a writ of mandamus may be successfully pursued by the state.

Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act

There are particular issues which arise when a person is ordered to register by a federal court because of a federal adjudication of delinquency for a sex offense. In particular, multiple courts have held that it is not a contravention of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act confidentiality provisions to require such individuals to register as a sex offender.

IV. Retroactive Application & Ex Post Facto Considerations

One of the first issues to be litigated as sex offender registration systems were established across the country was whether or not an offender who had been convicted prior to the passage of the laws requiring registration could be required to register. Numerous challenges to the retroactive application of registration laws were heard throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

United States Supreme Court

In 2003, the United States Supreme Court seemingly settled the issue in the case of Smith v. Doe, a challenge from a sex offender in the State of Alaska who argued that the imposition of registration requirements on him violated the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution. The Court held that registration and notification—under the specific facts of that case—were not punitive, and could, therefore, be retroactively imposed as regulatory actions.

While the issue was settled for a time, subsequent litigation has ensued based on increased sex offender registration and notification requirements in many jurisdictions since the Doe decision. A recent Sixth Circuit case held that Michigan’s SORNA-implementing law was ‘punitive’ and therefore could not be applied retroactively. In a series of recent cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Supreme Court has declined to take a fresh look at any Ex Post Facto implications raised by the increasing requirements which have been placed on registered sex offenders over the last 13 years.
Significant State Court Decisions

There have been seven state supreme courts in recent years that have held that the retroactive application of their sex offender registration and notification laws violate their respective state constitutions. Other state courts have found issues with the retroactive application of their sex offender registration laws in less sweeping fashion. In addition, in 2016, an unusual series of cases in Kansas first held that the state’s registration system was punitive in effect—and thus retroactive application was unconstitutional—then overturned that decision. Conversely, however, many courts continue to stand by the reasoning of the Smith v. Doe case in continuing to affirm the retroactive application of sex offender registration laws. For example, at least one state that has found an Ex Post Facto violation as applied to its own offenders does not apply to persons convicted in another state who then relocate.

Some courts require the specific performance of a plea agreement or court order when sex offender registration was not specifically ordered by the sentencing court, was bargained away as part of plea negotiations, or when an offender was given a specific classification or tier at sentencing. However, many states continue to permit registration and notification under such circumstances. For example, California held that a defendant was properly subjected to community notification in 2004 even though he had entered a plea agreement in 1991 which was silent on the issue.

Additional Court Opinions

A review of pertinent federal and state case law reveals that, in one case, a federal court enjoined the enactment of Nevada’s SORNA-implementing legislation based on Ex Post Facto concerns; although the federal court injunction has since been lifted, the state remains involved in litigation on the state level. In Texas, a Writ of Mandamus was granted compelling the Department of Public Safety to comply with a court order to remove an offender from the registry. In other states, some offenders have been able to be removed from the registry when the statute is changed in a way which inures to their benefit, but one court has held that increasing the penalties for a failure to register does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.

Massachusetts requires a due process hearing before any offender is ordered to comply with its full registration requirements, including those offenders convicted prior to the registration statute’s effective date. Applying community notification retroactively to Massachusetts’ existing level two offenders was recently held to violate due process.

V. Other Constitutional Issues

As previously mentioned, nearly all persons required to register as sex offenders must do so because they have been convicted of a criminal offense. Accordingly, by the time a person is actually required to register, a number of constitutional protections have already been afforded—namely, those which inure to a defendant throughout the course of a criminal trial and sentencing.
Varied Successful Challenges

Although the vast majority of constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and notification requirements have been unsuccessful, there have been some notable decisions based on constitutional grounds. For example, in 2015 a successful challenge was made utilizing the Bill of Attainder clause under Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution.\(^92\)

Other examples of successful challenges include opinions issued by state or federal courts which have held that: the collection of internet identifiers violates the First Amendment;\(^93\) being ordered to register as a sex offender triggers the protections of procedural due process;\(^94\) publishing information about an offender’s “primary and secondary targets” violates due process;\(^95\) being ordered to register as a parole condition violates due process when the underlying convictions are not sexual in nature;\(^96\) requiring registration for a conviction for solicitation, and not prostitution, when each offense had the same elements, violates due process;\(^97\) a ‘three-strikes’ sentence based on a failure to register conviction is cruel and unusual punishment;\(^98\) mandatory life imprisonment for a second conviction of failure to register is cruel and unusual punishment;\(^99\) and requiring an offender to continue to register when he had been convicted of having consensual sex with his 14-year old girlfriend (he was 18 at the time) and had his case successfully dismissed under a deferred disposition is cruel and unusual punishment.\(^100\)

Other State Constitutional Provisions

In addition to the decisions above, there have been some notable cases regarding the interaction between SORNA and the existing registration and notification laws in a state: Missouri has held that SORNA preempts state law to the extent that any state constitutional concerns are not implicated;\(^101\) and North Carolina concluded that SORNA is directly incorporated (in part) in to state law and that incorporation is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.\(^102\) In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a portion of its sex offender registration law because it violated the ‘single subject’ rule of the Pennsylvania Constitution.\(^103\)

Jury Determination of Obligation to Register as a Sex Offender

There are a number of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court which do not directly address sex offender registration, yet continue to have a bearing on litigation in the field. For example, the case of \textit{Apprendi v. New Jersey} has spawned a number of challenges to registration requirements; namely, contending that a jury should be required to determine whether an offender should be subject to the additional ‘punishment’ of sex offender registration.\(^104\) The test as to whether sex offender registration constitutes ‘punishment’ is the same as that used to determine whether something is ‘punitive’ for purposes of an Ex Post Facto analysis as discussed above. To date, most challenges under \textit{Apprendi} have been unsuccessful.\(^105\)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

One frequent argument in failure to register cases is that the offender had ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial for the underlying sex offense, because counsel did not advise them that they would be required to register as a sex offender. Most of these cases have focused on sex offender registration as a ‘collateral consequence’ of conviction; other cases involving whether a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary and intelligent have also discussed the issue. Recently, though, at least one court has concluded that the heightened registration and notification requirements imposed on sex offenders has rendered any registration requirement a ‘direct consequence’, rather than a ‘collateral consequence’, of conviction.

While most courts do not find any constitutional violation in these circumstances, one court held that an affirmative misrepresentation that an offender would not have to register as a sex offender is ineffective assistance of counsel; another determined that incorrect advice to an offender regarding whether he would be required to register as a sex offender is ineffective assistance of counsel; and a constitutional violation was found where counsel advised that an offender plead guilty to a charge of failure to register when the offender had never been convicted of an offense legally requiring registration.

Padilla v. Kentucky

Padilla v. Kentucky is a Supreme Court case which held that counsel’s failure to correctly advise a client that a conviction would count as a deportable offense under the Immigration and Naturalization Act was deficient assistance under the Sixth Amendment. Since the decision in Padilla, a number of cases have addressed the issue of whether counsel’s failure to advise their client that a conviction would result in sex offender registration also runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment; thus far, those challenges have been unsuccessful. The Supreme Court recently concluded that the holding in Padilla does not apply retroactively.

NFIB v. Sebelius and Arlington v. FCC

While beyond the scope of this update, other cases such as National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and Arlington v. FCC are having an impact on certain prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 2250.

Varied Unsuccessful Challenges

In addition to the challenges described above, offenders often raise other constitutional objections that lead to litigation. In prosecutions for state-level failure to register cases or civil challenges to registration requirements, offenders have launched unsuccessful challenges based on the following arguments: takings, double jeopardy, procedural due process, substantive due process, equal protection, the right to a trial by jury, right to travel, cruel and unusual punishment, full faith & credit, the supremacy clause, and separation of powers. Another set of constitutional arguments are those
advanced by the ‘sovereign citizen movement’ which, though creative, have proven unsuccessful. In addition, in *Bond v. United States*, the Supreme Court granted standing to sex offenders to challenge SORNA on Tenth Amendment grounds, where previously they had no standing to do so, but no challenges on those grounds have been successful at the circuit level thus far.

VI. Community Notification

Every state, tribe and territory that registers sex offenders also makes publicly available certain information about at least some of their sex offenders. While in earlier years community notification was handled via public meetings, fliers, and newspaper announcements, notification has now expanded to include publicly available and searchable websites, which are linked together via NSOPW. In 2016, the Washington Supreme Court held the state registry must disclose information about level I offenders to a private citizen, even though those offenders are not posted on the state’s public sex offender registry website.

VII. Failure to Register

For an offender to have any motivation for compliance with the sex offender registration process, there must be an enforcement component. Nearly all jurisdictions which require sex offender registration also have a criminal penalty for failure to register. The following are a sample of some of the prominent issues which arise in state-level failure to register prosecutions.

*Failure to Register as a ‘Continuing Offense’*

Many jurisdictions hold that a failure to register is a ‘continuing offense,’ much like larceny or escape, such that a person cannot be prosecuted for multiple failures to register within a given time frame.

*Failure to Register as a ‘Strict Liability’ Offense*

Many jurisdictions require a *mens rea* of some sort to be proven prior to permitting a person to be convicted of failure to register, while others hold that it is a strict liability offense.

*Notice*

All jurisdictions require that some kind of notice of registration requirements be given to a sex offender prior to their being held criminally liable for a failure to register. That notice can be ‘imperfect’ and still be sufficient. In other cases, the notice can be constructive, and still valid. However, there are situations where notice will be found insufficient.
Prosecution Based on Failure to Update Information

Most jurisdictions require sex offenders to update their registration information when that registration information changes. In one state, the failure to provide an online identifier supported a conviction for failure to register.140 In another, however, a change of residence outside of the country did not require the offender to update the state registry, and a failure to do so could not be prosecuted under state law.141

Venue

Generally speaking, the proper venue for a failure to register case is the jurisdiction in which the person has failed to comply with his registration requirements. In addition, at least one state has held that there is no need to prove where an offender was during the time that he failed to register.142 The federal failure to register statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, can also be utilized in cases where there has been interstate travel.

VIII. Residency Restrictions

SORNA’s minimum standards do not address or require residency restrictions in any way. When a jurisdiction chooses to impose residency restrictions on registered sex offenders, it prohibits registered sex offenders from residing within a certain perimeter of schools, day care centers, parks, and other locations frequented by children. These residency restrictions are generally passed and enforced on a local or municipal level, although, in some circumstances, a state, tribe, or territory might pass such provisions.143

This past year in North Carolina, one portion of the state’s residency restriction provisions were held to be unconstitutionally vague.144 In California, residency restrictions were held unconstitutional as applied on due process grounds.145 In New York and some other states, municipal residency restrictions have been invalidated because they were deemed to have been preempted by state law.146 In another case, the residency restriction was deemed to be punitive and therefore not retroactively applicable.147 The Eleventh Circuit recently permitted a case to proceed where the plaintiffs allege that Florida’s residency restrictions are punitive.148 More frequently, however, local residency restrictions have been upheld, such as in Colorado, where a local ordinance which in effect bars certain sex offenders from living within a city was not preempted by state law.150

IX. Sex Offender Registration and Notification in Indian Country

As previously discussed, 42 U.S.C. § 16927 created, for the first time, a carve-out of state jurisdiction over sex offenders who live, work, or attend school on the lands of certain federally-recognized Indian Tribes. Generally speaking, the tribes that were eligible to opt-in as SORNA registration jurisdictions are those who are not PL-280 tribes. As of September 15, 2016, there are approximately 160 federally-recognized tribes operating as SORNA registration jurisdictions; this means that they either have established, or are in the process of establishing, a sex offender registration and notification program.
The vast majority of the more than 100 tribes that have substantially implemented SORNA, moreover, have utilized the Model Tribal Code, which was developed by Indian Law experts in conjunction with the SMART Office and fully covers all of SORNA’s requirements.\footnote{151} There are many tribes that have more rigorous registration requirements than the states within which they are located, particularly for those tribes located within states that have not substantially implemented SORNA.\footnote{152} For example, in addition to possible criminal sanctions for failure to register, tribes are also generally able to exclude any person (such as a convicted sex offender) from their lands altogether.\footnote{153}

There are legal issues unique to Indian Country which impact the registration of tribal sex offenders or the enforcement of sex offender registration requirements against persons who reside on tribal lands or were convicted by tribal courts. For example, because of the different standards regarding the right to counsel in some tribal courts, it was sometimes argued that prosecuting a person based in part on an underlying tribal conviction violates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In 2016, the United States Supreme Court settled the issue, holding that tribal-court convictions obtained in proceedings that comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) may be used as predicate convictions in a subsequent federal prosecution.\footnote{154}

Tribal Residents and State Registration Responsibilities

Further complications may develop when an offender lives on tribal land but was convicted of a state or federal offense. One question which arises is whether an offender who exclusively lives, works, and attends school on tribal land can be compelled to register with the state within which that tribal land is located. If the offender cannot be compelled to register with the state, it falls to the tribe to register the offender, if the tribe has opted-in to SORNA’s provisions and is operating as a registration and notification jurisdiction under its terms.

For example, in New Mexico, the State cannot impose a duty to register on enrolled tribal members living on tribal land who have been convicted of federal sex offenses.\footnote{155} At the same time, in neighboring Arizona, persons living in Indian Country are required to keep their registration current with both the state and the tribe.\footnote{156} In Arizona, however, a tribal member residing on tribal land cannot be prosecuted under state law for failure to register unless a tribe’s registration responsibilities have been delegated to the state via SORNA’s delegation procedure.\footnote{157}

X. International Relocation and Registration

In 2011, the SORNA Supplemental Guidelines were issued by the Department of Justice, and added a requirement to SORNA’s baseline standards that jurisdictions were required to have their offenders inform them of any intended international travel at least 21 days prior to that travel taking place.\footnote{158} Per these standards, offenders are to provide authorities with information regarding their itinerary and intended destinations, among other items, and registration jurisdictions are required to provide this information to the National Sex Offender Targeting Center (NSOTC) of the United States Marshals Service.
Prior to 2016, there had been a circuit split as to whether an offender could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 when an offender leaves the country and fails to notify their registration jurisdiction of their departure. In the case of Nichols v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a sex offender could not be federally prosecuted for a failure to notify his registration jurisdiction that he was relocating to the Philippines.

On February 8, 2016, President Obama signed the International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders (IML). IML (1) codified the requirement that offenders provide 21-day advance notice of international travel; (2) specifically authorized the notification program of NSOTC; (3) specifically authorized the notification program of DHS’ Angel Watch; (4) amended 18 U.S.C. § 2250 to make a failure to provide advance notice of international travel a specific criminal violation; and (5) required the State Department to mark the passport of any person who is required to register as a sex offender based on a conviction where the victim was a minor.

To date, approximately 30 foreign countries have some form of nationwide or provincial sex offender registration systems. South Korea, the Province of Western Australia, and certain Canadian provinces also make some information publicly available via websites, while other countries have different community notification procedures.

For more detailed information about foreign sex offender registration and notification systems, please see the second edition of the Global Overview of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Systems, recently published by the SMART Office.

XI. Miscellaneous

The status of having been convicted of a sex offense, being required to register as a sex offender, or having failed to register as a sex offender, can trigger other legal issues in a variety of contexts. In addition to all of the topics discussed above, the following matters also arise in these circumstances.

Defamation

Defamation is a civil tort action which can be pursued when someone’s reputation in the community has been injured by false or malicious statements. Some individuals have unsuccessfully made claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of defamation, when they were posted on the sex offender registry website without the due process provided by statute.

Fair Credit Reporting Act

Certain people have had limited success in pursuing claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act when they have been incorrectly reported by a credit bureau as having prior sex offense convictions.
Homeless & Transient Offenders

Homeless or transient sex offenders have generated a great deal of litigation as states have tried to enforce registration requirements. Many states are rewriting their laws in such a way that these offenders are clearly required to register.170 This issue has recently come to the fore in the City of Chicago, where there has been a great deal of civil litigation based on its policy to deny registration to any sex offender who lacked a fixed address.171

In most cases, an offender’s homelessness has not prevented a successful prosecution for failure to register, although sometimes statutory or evidentiary problems have arisen.172 Differing check-in requirements for homeless offenders as opposed to offenders who have a residence address have been affirmed.173 In one case, a court found that when an offender repeatedly uses a ‘mail drop’ address as his legal address, he ‘resides’ at that location for the purposes of a prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender.174 In another, when an offender still technically lived at the same address, even though he lived in an outbuilding or his truck rather than the main residence, he could not be prosecuted for a failure to update his residence address.175 However, in an attempt to prosecute a long-haul trucker for failure to register, a conviction could not be had, even when he had prolonged absences from his registered residence.176

HUD Housing

One collateral consequence of a state-imposed lifetime sex offender registration requirement is that a person is no longer permitted, pursuant to federal law, to be admitted to any “federally assisted housing.”177 However, once a person has been admitted to a program such as Section 8,178 they cannot be thereafter terminated because of a new, or newly-discovered, lifetime sex offender registration requirement.179 A person may be prosecuted for perjury if they have lied on an application for Section 8 housing about the status of a lifetime registered sex offender living in the residence.180 One recent case permitted the termination of a beneficiary’s assistance based only on the address displayed on the public sex offender registry website for a jurisdiction.181

Immigration & Deportation

A recent case analyzed in detail the requirement of the Adam Walsh Act that a person convicted of a specified offense against a minor is not entitled to file a petition to sponsor a fiancé or family member unless the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security determines that the offender poses no risk to the person on whose behalf the petition is filed.182

Convictions for a failure to register have triggered subsequent deportation proceedings in some cases. There is a circuit split as to whether a conviction for a state failure to register offense is a crime involving ‘moral turpitude’ under the immigration code such that a person is removable because of that conviction.183
Impeachment

Generally speaking, rules of evidence permit attacking the credibility of a witness by way of introducing evidence of certain prior convictions. In one state, a conviction for failure to register was determined to be a ‘crime of deception’, rendering it admissible in a subsequent criminal trial to impeach the defendant’s testimony.\textsuperscript{184}

Sentencing Enhancement Under Federal Law

Under federal law, additional punishment can result if certain crimes are committed while an offender is required to register as a sex offender. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, the commission of certain offenses against a minor while the perpetrator is required to register as a sex offender under any law will result in a ten year mandatory minimum sentence to run consecutively to any other sentences imposed.\textsuperscript{185} The retroactive application of these provisions does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.\textsuperscript{186}

XII. Conclusion

The statutes, regulations and laws addressing sex offender registration and notification in the United States are varied and complex. While this summary seeks to provide updated and accurate information, practitioners are advised to conduct their own research to confirm that they are utilizing the most current information available and applicable in their jurisdiction.

For any questions about SORNA itself or for more information about any of the SMART Office projects described in this resource, please feel free to contact the SMART Office at asksmart@usdoj.gov or visit our website at www.smart.gov.
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ENDNOTES

1 Except for military offenders, addressed in more detail below, in section I.

2 Colleges must also annually include in a security report a statement advising the campus community the location where information about registered sex offenders on campus may be obtained. Violence Against Women Act; Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,785-86 (Oct. 20, 2014).


6 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994). This was an incentive-based system, where States would be penalized (via loss of federal grant funds) for a failure to implement its terms. The five principal U.S. territories (American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) were included under Wetterling’s requirements by way of Final Guidelines issued in April of 1996. Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,110 (April 4, 1996).

7 In the same way that the Wetterling Act’s provisions were incentive-based (see supra text accompanying note 6), so were the provisions of Megan’s Law.


9 For any State or Territory, the penalty is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 16925:

For any fiscal year after the end of the period for implementation, a jurisdiction that fails, as determined by the Attorney General, to substantially implement this title shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under subpart 1 of part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3750, et seq.).

If the 10 percent penalty is assessed, the jurisdiction can apply for reallocation of those funds to use for purposes of implementing SORNA.

For Tribes that elected to function as registration jurisdictions, the penalty contained in 42 U.S.C. § 16925 may apply, if the tribe qualifies for that funding, which is determined by formula. However, there is a separate and significant penalty for non-compliance by tribes contained in 42 U.S.C. § 16927: For any federally-recognized Indian Tribe that the Attorney General determines has “not substantially implemented the requirements of [SORNA] and is not likely to become capable of doing so within a reasonable amount of time,” the statute creates automatic delegation of SORNA functions:
. . . to another jurisdiction or jurisdictions within which the territory of the tribe is located [and requires the tribe] to provide access to its territory and such other cooperation and assistance as may be needed to enable such other jurisdiction or jurisdictions to carry out and enforce the requirements of [SORNA].

The meaning of “provide access” and other issues regarding delegation of registration and notification responsibilities under SORNA for federally-recognized Indian Tribes is discussed in documents #12 and #13 of the SMART Office’s “Topics in SORNA Implementation” series, http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/SORNA_ImplementationDocuments.pdf.


Official reports detailing the systems of each jurisdiction for which an official report has been completed by the SMART Office are available at http://www.smart.gov/sorna-map.htm.

The precursor of NSOPW was NSOPR, the National Sex Offender Public Registry, which was the official name of the website from the time of its administrative creation in 2005 until the passage of SORNA in 2006. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice Activates National Sex Offender Public Registry Website (July 20, 2005), available at http://www.amberalert.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/ojp_05_0720.htm. By July of 2006, all fifty states were linked to NSOPR. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, All 50 States Linked to Department of Justice National Sex Offender Public Registry Website (July 3, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/July/06_ag_414.html.

The SMART Office administers the Tribe and Territory Sex Offender Registry System (TTSORS), which is a system developed particularly for federally-recognized Indian Tribes and U.S. Territories which had not previously operated a sex offender registration system or website. All of the information in TTSORS is supplied and administered by the jurisdictions. More information about TTSORS is available at http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/TTSORSFactSheet.pdf.

For example, a local police department might submit an offender’s fingerprints to the FBI at the time of arrest. See Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093.


In many cases, an offender will have had their fingerprints, palm prints or DNA submitted prior to the registration process, as part of their arrest, sentencing, incarceration, or at some other point in the processing of their case. Registration agencies are not required to submit duplicate entries to federal databases where a fingerprint, palm print, or DNA record already exists. Final Guidelines, supra note 8, at 38,057.

18 U.S.C. § 4042(c). The Bureau of Prisons is a Department of Justice subdivision and part of the Executive Branch. Federal probation officers are governed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, a Judicial Branch Office.


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22 See id.

23 Notice of Amendment of Privacy Act System of Records, 80 Fed. Reg. 24,269 § HH (April 30, 2015). ICE-ERO is now using the SORNA Exchange Portal to provide notifications to jurisdictions when a sex offender is released from ICE-ERO custody. For additional information about the SORNA Exchange Portal, see http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/SORNA_Bootcampfactsheet.pdf.

24 The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) operates the Sex Offender Tracking Team (SOTT) which is collocated with NSOTC in Crystal City, Virginia. SOTT publishes a bi-annual survey of the number of registered sex offenders in the United States. http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/Sex_Offenders_Map.pdf. As of June 2016, there were 851,870 registered sex offenders in the United States. For more information about SOTT, see http://www.missingkids.com/SOTT.

25 ‘Federal Enclave’ is a legal term of art which refers to property that is either in whole or in part under the law enforcement jurisdiction of the United States Government. See generally the ‘Enclave Clause,’ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“[T]he Congress shall have Power…[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings”); see also 40 U.S.C. § 3112 (2006) (concerning federal jurisdiction). A similar issue arises regarding offenders located within National Parks or other federally-held land that holds the status of ‘federal enclave’.


30 See Army Regulation 190-45, § 2-7 (2007).

31 Registration of Sex Offenders on Army Installations (inside and outside the Continental United States), 32 C.F.R. § 635.6 (2015). Provost Marshal officials have also been directed to seek to establish Memoranda of Understanding with state and local sex offender registration officials to facilitate the flow of information regarding sex offenders (along with other criminal justice information). Establishing Memoranda of Understanding, 32 C.F.R. § 635.20 (2015); see also Army Regulation 27-10, §§ 24-1 to 24-4 (May 11, 2016) (Registration of Military Sexual Offenders), http://www.apd.army.mil/Search/ePubsSearch/ePubsSearchDownloadPage.aspx?docID=0902c8518003514c;


34 Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority, Dep’t of Defense Instruction 1325.07, Appx. 4 to Enc. 2 (March 11, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/132507p.pdf. Although the United States Coast Guard is technically a part of the Department of Homeland Security, this Instruction also governs their proceedings. See Kebodeaux, 133 S.Ct. at 2496.
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34 Navy courts-martial results are available every month, and the most recent report can be found at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=95679 (June 2016). USMC courts-martial summaries are available by region and can be viewed at http://www.mciwest.marines.mil/StaffOffices/LegalServicesSupportSectionWest/CourtMartialResults.aspx and http://www.mcieast.marines.mil/StaffOffices/LegalServicesSupportSectionEast/EasternRegionalTrialCounselOffice/CourtsMartialResults.aspx (courts-martial page does not appear to be populated at the time of publication); a summary version is available on a monthly basis for all courts-martial, the latest being from April 2016, at http://www.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/CourtsMartial201604.pdf. Recent monthly summary of Air Force Courts-Martial can be found at http://www.afjag.af.mil/Portals/77/documents/Jan16_Results.pdf?ver=2016-08-30-113200-147.


38 Withheld adjudications have been held to require registration under SORNA. See United States v. Bridges, 901 F. Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Va. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 2014) (withheld adjudication in Florida registerable under SORNA); Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759 (Mo. 2013) (“suspended imposition of sentence” is a ‘conviction’ under SORNA).


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41 “Sex Offense” is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A). For guidance on which persons convicted of UCMJ offenses are required to register, see United States v. Jones, 383 Fed. Appx. 885 (11th Cir. 2010) and Dep’t of Defense Instruction 1325.07, supra n. 33.


43 In other words, there will be situations where SORNA imposes a registration requirement directly on an offender, but the jurisdiction where that offender lives, works or attends school refuses to register him, because the jurisdiction’s laws do not require registration for the offense of conviction. See Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 94 A.3d 791 (Md. 2014) (State is not required to register an offender if the state’s laws do not require it).

44 Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. 2012) (“the [state] registration requirements apply to any person who ‘has been’ required to register as a sex offender pursuant to federal law. Consequently, even if Doe presently is not required to register pursuant to SORNA, he ‘has been’ required to register as a sex offender and, therefore, is required to register [with the state].”) (offender convicted in 1983 required to register, even though Missouri law only requires registration of persons convicted on or after January 1, 1995).


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52 See United States v. Schofield, 802 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2015) (18 USC § 1470 registerable under SORNA, even though it is not listed); United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Hahn, 551 F. 3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008) (probation conditions properly required registration in a fraud case when there was a prior state conviction for a sex offense); United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (conviction for alien smuggling which had underlying facts of sex trafficking properly triggered registration); United States v. Jensen, 278 Fed. Appx. 548 (6th Cir. 2008) (Conspiracy to Commit Sexual Abuse is a registerable offense). But see United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed. Appx. 433 (5th Cir. 2008) (where only evidence of sexual misconduct was three unsubstantiated police reports, registration requirement was inappropriate); State v. Coman, 273 P.3d 701 (Kan. 2012) (bestiality is not a registerable offense); State v. Haynes, 760 N.W.2d 283 (Mich. App. 2008) (bestiality not registerable).


54 See, e.g., State v. Duran, 967 A.2d 184 (Md. 2009) (determining that Indecent Exposure was not registerable because the lewdness element of the crime incorporated conduct that was not sexual in addition to that which could be sexual).


56 SORNA’s minimum standards require that jurisdictions register juveniles who were at least 14 years old at the time of the offense and who have been adjudicated delinquent for committing (or attempting or conspiring to commit) a sexual act with another by force, by the threat of serious violence, or by rendering unconscious or drugging the victim. “Sexual Act” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246.

57 The Supplemental Guidelines (2011) give jurisdictions full discretion over whether they will post information about juveniles adjudicated delinquent of sex offenses on their public registry website. Supplemental Guidelines, supra n. 8 at 1636-37.


61 See, e.g., Clark v. State, 957 A.2d 1 (Del. 2008) (lifetime registration requirement for juvenile was not contravened by requirement to consider the ‘best interests of the child’ in fashioning a disposition). Some states go beyond SORNA’s requirements. See, e.g., State v. I.C.S., 145 So.3d 350 (La. 2014) (defendants who committed sex offenses prior to age 14, were not transferrable to adult court at that age, and whose offenses did not require registration upon a juvenile adjudication of delinquency, were prosecuted in adult court in their twenties for those offenses and required to register); In re J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720 (S.D. 2011) (14-year-old boy adjudicated delinquent for consensual sex with his 12 year-old girlfriend was ordered to register for life).


63 State v. I.C.S., supra n. 61.


65 See, e.g., In re Crockett, 159 Cal. App. 4th 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (juvenile adjudicated delinquent of sex offense in Texas was not required to register when he moved to California); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 275 (Apr. 24, 2015) (juvenile adjudicated delinquent in Michigan required to register in Kentucky, even though Kentucky-adjudicated juveniles are not required to register); Smith v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 728 (Sept. 12, 2014) (Illinois-adjudicated offender required to register in Kentucky because he was required to register in Illinois). Nebraska also only requires registration for a juvenile adjudication of delinquency for a sex offense when the offender is
convicted outside of Nebraska and has a registration requirement imposed by another state. See Nebraska Sex Offender Registry: FAQ’s,https://sor.nebraska.gov/FAQ (last visited September 14, 2016). But see A.W. v. Peterson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36077 (D. Neb. March 21, 2016) (interpreting Nebraska’s statutes and regulations governing sex offender registration to not require registration for a juvenile residing in Nebraska who was adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense which required them to register in Minnesota).

See In re Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 2008) (treating juvenile sex offenders convicted of the same crimes as adult sex offenders differently and more harshly than the adult sex offenders served no rational purpose and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); cf. In re C.P.T., 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 929 (Aug. 5, 2008) (lifetime registration requirement for juveniles does not violate due process).

In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (due process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (procedural due process). Other courts have held that registration requirements as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense does not violate the 8th Amendment. United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2013) (military conviction); People v. J.O., 2015 Colo. App. LEXIS 1319 (Aug. 27, 2015); see also In re Justin B., 747 S.E.2d 774 (S.C. 2013) (lifetime GPS monitoring of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense does not violate the 8th Amendment).


In 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case where the Ninth Circuit had held that the juvenile registration provisions of SORNA were unconstitutional when applied retroactively. United States v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977 (2009), vacated and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011), appeal dismissed as moot, 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). In its decision, however, the Supreme Court did not in any way address the question of the constitutionality of the retroactive application of SORNA’s requirement that certain adjudicated juveniles register as sex offenders.


SORNA requires that jurisdictions register offenders whose “predicate convictions predate the enactment of SORNA or the implementation of SORNA in the jurisdiction” when an offender is:

(1) incarcerated or under supervision, either for the predicate sex offense or for some other crime;
(2) already registered or subject to a pre-existing sex offender registration requirement under the jurisdiction’s law; or
(3) reenter the jurisdiction’s justice system because of a subsequent felony conviction.

Final Guidelines, supra n. 8, at 38046; Supplemental Guidelines, supra n. 8, at 1639.


Id.

See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009) (person convicted after the initial passage of the law could be required to comply with amended requirements).


See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S.Ct. 2496 (2013) (assuming without deciding that Congress did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause in enacting SORNA’s registration requirements); United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S.Ct. 2860 (2011) (declining to address whether SORNA’s requirements violated the Ex Post Facto clause on grounds of mootness); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (declining to address the issue of whether SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto clause).


The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that requiring lifetime registration without the opportunity for review violates the Ex Post Facto provisions of the state’s constitution. Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077 (N.H. 2015) (registration requirements can only be applied to the petitioner if he is “promptly given an opportunity
for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he is permitted to demonstrate that he no longer poses a risk sufficient to justify continued registration…[and] must be afforded periodic opportunities for further hearings, at reasonable intervals, to revisit whether registration continues to be necessary to protect the public”). In Pennsylvania, the retroactive application of a requirement to appear in-person to update any changes to an offender’s registration information was held to violate the Ex Post Facto clause. Cappolino v. Commissioner, 102 A.3d 1254 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). But see Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (retroactive application of new registration scheme did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause).


82 Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. 2014) (defendant entitled to specific performance of his plea agreement, a component of whose negotiation was that he would not be required to register as a sex offender). But see Commonwealth v. Giannantonio, 114 A.3d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (extension of state duration of registration period did not violate Ex Post Facto when conviction secured pursuant to federal plea agreement).

83 Doe v. Harris, 302 P.3d 598 (Cal. 2013).


85 ACLU v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012). The Nevada Supreme Court also held that retroactive application of registration and notification requirements to juveniles adjudicated delinquent does not violate Due Process or the Ex Post Facto clause. State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 306 P.3d 369 (Nev. 2013); injunction dissolved, S.M. v. State, 2015 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 131 (Feb. 6, 2015).


89 Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661 (Ky. 2010).

90 See the procedure followed in Massachusetts, where the Sex Offender Registry Board must find that the offender poses a danger to the community before requiring registration: 803 CMR 106(B), available at http://www.mass.gov/eopps/docs/sorb/sor-regulations.pdf. In Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 41 N.E.3d 1058 (Mass. 2015), the court held that the burden of proof for classification was no longer by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ but was constitutionally required to be by the higher standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence’.


93 Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013) (statute prohibiting sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, and chat programs violated the First Amendment); Doe v. State, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D. Ne. 2012) (requirement to provide internet identifiers found unconstitutional on First Amendment and other grounds); Doe v. Shurtleff, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73787 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008), vacated after legislative changes, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73955 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009); Harris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (statute prohibiting use of a social
networking site by a registered sex offender violated the First Amendment).  
Contrary to the current law, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), *pet’n for cert. granted*, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6404 (Oct. 28, 2016) (prosecution for having a Facebook page when it is banned by state law is permissible).

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011).

State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (Utah 2008) (‘target’ information could include, among other things, a description of the offender’s preferred victim demographics).


Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2008).


*In re* McClain, 741 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. 2013) (North Carolina’s registration law directly incorporates the clean record provisions of SORNA); *see In re* Hall, 768 S.E.2d 39 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (using SORNA’s tiering structure).


530 U.S. 466 (2000).

*See* People v. Mosley, 344 P.3d 788 (Cal. 2015) (residency restrictions are not ‘punishment’ for the purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis); Colorado v. Rowland, 207 P.3d 890 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Meredith, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 324 (April 8, 2008).

The American Bar Association’s Collateral Consequences Project, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org, has produced a standing resource which lists all collateral consequences which flow at the federal and state level for convictions of certain crimes. Users may select ‘sex offenses’ as a search term and view all of the collateral consequences which may be imposed on persons so convicted.


United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (substantial basis to question the providence of guilty plea when the judge failed to ensure that the defendant understood the registration requirements associated with a plea of guilty). The *Riley* decision was clarified in *United States v.* Talkington, 73 M.J. 212 (2014) as applying only to considerations raised by the *Padilla* case and its progeny regarding the voluntariness of guilty pleas, and is further clarified in *Washington v. United States*, 74 M.J. 560 (A.C.C.A. 2014), as not applying retroactively.


*Id.*


133 S.Ct. 1863 (2013).
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118 See United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2015) (unsuccessful argument under Sebelius); United States v. Anderson, 771 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Rivers, 588 F. App’x 905 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125 (2013) (same); Chevron was discussed in United States v. Piper, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113059 (D. Vt. Aug. 12, 2013) (successful argument under Chevron that the SORNA Final Guidelines must be followed in determining whether someone is required to register under SORNA).


121 Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010) (defendant had a liberty interest in being free from registration requirements where he had not been convicted of a sex offense); State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630 (Conn. 2008) (no due process hearing required); Doe v. Dept’ of Public Safety, 971 A.2d 975 (Md. App. 2009) (presumption of dangerousness flowing from a rape conviction was permissible); Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146 (Va. 2013).

122 Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir 2014) (requiring sexually violent predators to check in every 90 days did not violate substantive due process); Woe v. Spitzer, 571 F.Supp.2d 382 (E.D. N.Y. 2008) (when amended statute extended the registration period by ten years three days before petitioner’s registration requirement expired, there was no protected liberty interest).


124 See Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180 (D.C. 2008) (underlying misdemeanor charges which required registration upon conviction were “petty” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, and a jury trial was not required); In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008). But see Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2008) (because of the seriousness of the consequences of being designated a sex offender, jury trial must be afforded when there is a special allegation of sexual motivation in a misdemeanor case).


126 People v. Nichols, 176 Cal. App. 4th 428 (3d Dist. 2009) (28 years to life sentence for failure to register under California’s three-strikes law did not violate the 8th Amendment); People v. T.D., 823 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. 2011) (requiring a juvenile to register was not cruel and unusual punishment), dismissed as moot, 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012); State v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516 (Ohio 2015) (Tier II registration requirements for an offense committed when the offender was 21 and the victim was 15 is not cruel and unusual punishment).

127 Rosin v. Monken, 599 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (an offender convicted in New York was promised in his plea agreement that he would never have to register as a sex offender, but when he moved to Illinois and was required to register under its laws, it was not a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see Burton v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (State unsuccessfully argued that the Full Faith and Credit clause should apply).


130 Proponents of the sovereign citizen movement “believe they are not subject to federal or state statutes or proceedings, reject most forms of taxation as illegitimate, and place special significance on commercial law.” United States v. Harding, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62471 (W.D. Va., May 1, 2013) (18 U.S.C. § 2250 prosecution), quoting United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012). In Harding the defendant argued that the federal court did not have jurisdiction over him, citing the Organic Act of 1871, the fact that his name was listed in all caps on the indictment, that there was no corpus delicti for the offense, and that the federal court was an “Admiralty Court” because the flag in the courtroom had fringe on it. Id. at *3-4,*15.


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137 Petway v. State, 661 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. App. 2008) (pre-release notice of registration requirements is not a prerequisite to the obligation to register); Barrientos v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7712 (June 24, 2013) (primarily Spanish-speaking defendant properly convicted even when all notices were in English and he claimed he did not understand his responsibilities).
139 State v. Binnarr, 733 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 2012) (notice of changed registration responsibilities sought to be proven by way of an unreturned letter, without more, does not prove actual notice sufficient to prosecute for failure to register).
140 State v. White, 58 A.3d 643 (N.H. 2012) (defendant failed to report the creation of a MySpace account).
144 Doe v. Cooper, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21412 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 2016) (prohibition on being present at “any place where minors gather for regularly scheduled educational, recreational, or social programs” is impermissibly vague).
145 In re William Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015).
147 See Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009) (Kentucky’s residency restrictions exceeded the nonpunitive purpose of public safety and thus violated the Ex Post Facto clause; see also Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 759 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2014) (standing granted in challenge to residency restrictions suit), all claims dismissed on remand, 136 F.Supp. 3d 752 (E.D. Tex. 2015). But see McAteer v. Riley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26209 (M.D. Ala. March 31, 2008) (“The court expresses no opinion today on whether McAteer could present evidence and arguments to establish by the clearest proof that the residency and employment restrictions violate the Ex Post Facto clause and leaves that question for another day”).
148 Doe v. Miami-Dade County, 838 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2016).
152 For example, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR) was one of the first tribes to implement SORNA, and met all of SORNA’s requirements in doing so, see the SMART Office’s Substantial Implementation Report at http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/sorna/ConfTribes-UmatillaIndianReservation.pdf. CTUIR is located entirely within the State of Oregon, which fails short of many of SORNA’s provisions. Maxine Bernstein, Sex Offenders in Oregon: State Fails to Track Hundreds,
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United States v. Bryant, 84 U.S.L.W. 4400 (2016). For previous cases holding that tribal court convictions could be used in subsequent federal prosecutions, see Kirkaldie v. United States, 21 F.Supp. 3d 1100 (D. Mont. 2014) (domestic violence prosecution); United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (admissable so long as the uncounseled conviction would not violate the U.S. Constitution) (possession of a firearm prosecution); United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2011) (tribal court convictions that meet the due process requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) may be admitted in subsequent federal prosecutions) (domestic violence prosecution); United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (domestic violence prosecution). There are also cases that have interpreted the above decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Bundy, 966 F.Supp. 2d 1175 (D. N.M. 2013) (tribal conviction did not meet the Shavanaux test) (DUI prosecution).


United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. DeJarnette, 741 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2013).


Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 8 at 1637-38.

United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that an offender could be prosecuted for relocating to the Philippines without notifying domestic registration officials), overruled, Nichols v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1113 (2016). Contra United States v. Lunsford, 725 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that an offender could not be prosecuted for relocating to the Philippines without notifying domestic registration officials).


There is a disclosure scheme in place in the United Kingdom authorizing law enforcement to provide details of certain sex offenders, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/child-sex-offender-disclosure.


The fact that a person has been convicted of a sex offense involving children can result in the revocation of a person’s Certified Shorthand Reporter’s License, Sonntag v. Stewart, 2015 Ill. App. LEXIS, 919 (Dec. 11, 2015), or their Ham radio license, FCC Reverses ALJ’s Decision, Revokes Convicted Sex Offender’s Ham License, ARRL.ORG, http://www.arrl.org/news/fcc-reverses-alj-s-decision-revokes-convicted-sex-offender-s-amateur-radio-license (Nov. 13, 2014). In at least one state, there is a statutory presumption against any registered sex offender being granted unsupervised visitation, custody, or residential placement of a child. 13 DEL. CODE ANN. § 724A.
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172 See People v. Deluca, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2014) (even though shelter had limited hours, it counted as a ‘residence’ for the purposes of registration); State v. Allman, 321 P.3d 557 (Co. Ct. App. 2012) (offender used his car as a residence when working away from ‘home’ during the week, was a ‘residence’ for purposes of the statute); Branch v. State, 917 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (homeless defendant was successfully prosecuted for failure to register when he failed to inform authorities that he had left a shelter); Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (offender kicked out of house by wife and staying with friends had to update his registration every time he moved); Tobar v. State, 284 S.W.3d 133 (Ky. 2009) (when offender did not notify authorities of leaving homeless shelter, conviction for failure to register was proper); State v. Samples, 198 P.3d 803 (Mont. 2008) (when offender failed to notify authorities of leaving shelter, conviction was proper); Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201 (Pa. Super. 2009) (where defendant was unable to rent a room at his intended residence he had a duty to inform registry officials of a change of address); Breeden v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2150 (March 26, 2008) (offender who moved out of hotel into car in parking lot of hotel properly convicted and sentenced to 55 years). But see Commonwealth v. Bolling, 893 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. App. 2008) (offender did not need to update his address when he found a friend willing to take him in for a few days); State v. Dinkins, 810 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 2012) (offender was charged with failure to register, prior to release from incarceration, for failure to provide a residence address, and this was not permissible).
178 ‘Section 8’ is the common shorthand reference to the housing assistance provisions contained in the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 836, Title I, § 8 (Sept. 1, 1937), as amended.

Bushra v. Holder, 529 Fed. Appx. 659 (6th Cir. 2013) (conviction for failure to register is a crime involving moral turpitude). Contra Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. 2014); Efange v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011); Plascencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009).


Statute addressed in United States v. Walizer, 600 Fed. Appx. 546 (9th Cir. 2015). In Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), the Supreme Court concluded that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.” Id.

United States v. Hardeman, 704 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2013).